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OMNISCIENCE, IMMUTABILITY, AND
THE DIVINE MODE OF KNOWING
Thomas D. Sullivan*

Recent attacks on the classical doctrine that God is both omniscient and
immutable reason that God's knowledge of temporal events must be adequately expressible in indexical or nonindexical propositions, and that, on
either account, the doctrine is incoherent. I argue that this is a false dilemma,
that Aquinas exposed it as such, and that he offered a solution to the problem
seldom considered by either proponents or opponents of the classical theory.
I then defend Aquinas' neglected proposal.

1. The Problem
There was a time when it was widely held that God, perfect in all ways,
was beyond change. Indeed, change did not even exist until God created the
world. By his thought and loving action, God thereafter transformed the
world, not himself. In our time, however, a new orthodoxy has replaced the
old. Many philosophers and theologians now teach that the notion that God
stands stiff and immutable above time and the flux of things is a wayward
idea of the Greeks, at variance with scripture and radically incoherent. l In an
influential essay a few years back, Norman Kretzmann set out the following
argument, widely adopted by proponents of the new position. 2
(1) A perfect being is not subject to change.
(2) A perfect being knows everything.
(3) A being that knows everything always knows what time it is.
(4) A being that always knows what time it is is subject to change.

Therefore:
(5) A perfect being is subject to change.

Therefore:
(6) A perfect being is not a perfect being.

Finally, therefore,
(7) There is no perfect being.
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There have been a number of recent replies to the Argument from Omniscience, one by Kretzmann himself.3 Rather oddly, however, though writers
on both sides of the debate often take Aquinas as representative of the classical position, few consider the remarkable proposal at the heart of Thomas's
solution. 4 My main purpose here is to draw attention to this proposal, which
seems to me to light up an entire range of questions about the operation of
the divine mind.
Before turning to Aquinas it will be useful to review briefly a common
response to the Argument from Omniscience. That response, often taken to
be Aquinas' own, fails. But Aquinas' solution, I will argue, is left untouched
by the Argument from Omniscience.

2. A Standard Reply to the Argument from Omniscience
What can a defender of the classical view say in response to the Argument
from Omniscience? The defender's first choice might be to deny proposition
(4). Propositions (1) and (2) are classical assumptions. Proposition (3)-A
being that knows everything always know what time it is-seems obvious.
But proposition (4) looks entirely gratuitous. Why should anyone think that
a being that always knows what time it is is subject to change?
Proposition (4), however, is not a gratuitous assumption. A very strong
argument can be made for it.5 If I know, say, that it is now noon, I do not
now know that it is one o'clock. To know that it is one o'clock, I must wait
an hour. Then, however, I will no longer know it is noon. But to know one
thing at one time and not to know it at another is to change. So, more
generally,
(A) Necessarily, a being that always knows what time it is [now] knows
different things at different times.
(B) Necessarily, a being that knows different things at different times
changes.

It seems, then, that a being that always knows what time it is now is indeed
subject to change.
Perhaps, then, we have moved too quickly past (3), the claim that a being
that knows everything always knows what time it is. For on the traditional
view, God is not only immutable, but timeless. He does not know one thing
at one time and another at another time, but everything in an eternal present.
A classical theorist should reject (3) unless it is restricted to timebound
beings. With this restriction, however, it fails to mesh with (4).
Let's take a closer look at this point. To say that a being that knows
everything always knows what time it is, could mean either
(3a) Throughout all time the (timebound) being knows what time it is.
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or
(3b) Throughout all its (timeless) existence, the being knows what time it is
quoad nos, i.e., what time it is for those whose existence is temporal.

The classical theorist accepts (3) only in the sense of (3b). God "always"
knows what time it is in a timeless sense of "always." But, proposition (4) is
true only if "always" is taken temporally. Thus there is no genuine connection
between (3) and (4). The Argument from Omniscience trades on an ambiguity.

3. The Inadequacy of the Standard Response
But does the rejoinder by the classical theorist really solve the problem?
Many think it does not. Arthur Prior observes "it seems an extraordinary way
of affirming God's omniscience if a person, when asked what God knows
now, must say "Nothing," and when asked what he knew yesterday, must
again say "Nothing," and must yet again say "Nothing" when asked what
God will know tomorrow. "6
Prior's taunt, however, should not disturb a defender of the classical theory.
Of course it looks like an "an extraordinary way of affirming God's omniscience" if all you focus on are the denials. But the defender of God's atemporal omniscience affirms as well as denies. The defender affirms divine
omniscience while denying imperfections. One might as well say that it is an
extraordinary way of affirming God's power if a person, when asked what
God can lift with his right arm, must say "Nothing," and with his left, "Nothing," and with his teeth, "Nothing." By so answering no one is trying to affirm
anything, but only trying to deny absurd anthropomorphisms. It would be an
extraordinary way to affirm God's infinite intelligence by denying God has
the brains of a rabbit. But what should one say? God does have the brains of
a rabbit?
A much deeper difficulty, however, confronts the classical position. There
seems to be no proper answer to the question: What, precisely, does God
know "throughout eternity" when he knows temporal events? Suppose it is
now the twelfth of May. Does God know that it is now the twelfth of May?
If so that knowledge would seem to locate God's awareness, and thus God
Himself, in a time frame. For knowing that today is the twelfth of May entails
knowing one's temporal position. And it follows from knowing one's temporal position that one has a temporal position. Thus it is a necessary condition of knowing it is now the twelfth of May that one have a temporal
position. 7
To avoid this, some note that we may know and represent the same facts
in different ways. Jill can know that Jack has a toothache, without knowing
it in the same way Jack does. Jack thinks: I have a toothache. Jill thinks: He
has a toothache. Similarly a timeless being could know what Jack knows
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when Jack thinks It is now the twelfth of May, but represent the fact in a
somewhat different way. A timeless being could have recourse to eternal
statements expressing only a certain order among events. For example, the
being could say that the twelfth of May of a given year is so many days after
the birth of Christ. 8
This, however, will not do. Kretzmann exhibits the futility of such a reply
with a striking piece of parallel reasoning. The knowledge of contingent
events attributed to God on this account would be like the knowledge you
would have of a movie you had written, directed, acted in, and seen many
times. You would know every scene in complete detail and you would know
the sequence of scenes, and if there were a visible clock in every scene, you
would also know the time of every scene. But if the film were now showing
in a distinct theatre, the patrons would have one big advantage over you.
They, but not you, would know what was on the screen now. An omniscient
being must not only know the entire scheme of temporal events, but as
Kretzmann notes, at what stage of realization that scheme now is. 9 You might
know that Annushka spills the sunflower oil before Berlioz slips on it and
slides down the slope leading to the streetcar rails. But you would not know
whether the screen shows Annushka spilling the oil or Berlioz sliding to his
death.
A defender of the classical theory, therefore, cannot counter the Argument
from Omniscience just by insisting that God stands outside of time. For the
defender still must say what it is that God knows. To say that what he knows
is just the temporal sequence is to deprive God of the knowledge of what is
happening at any particular momenL 10 This is tantamount to giving up the
claim (2) that a perfect being knows everything.
The difficulty for the classical theory, then, is this. Suppose proposition
(3)-A being that knows everything always knows what time it is-is understood in such a way as to place the being in time. Then it connects with
(4)-A being that always knows what time it is is subject to change-and
there is no equivocation. The Argument from Omniscience goes through.
Suppose, on the other hand, "always" in (3) is understood to mean eternally.
Then (2) turns out false; there will be much that a perfect being will not know,
namely, what is going on as it is going on. Either way, then, the classical
position appears incoherent.
4. Aquinas' Proposal
With these difficulties in mind, let us tum now to Aquinas' proposal.
Thomas takes up the problem immediately after arguing that God's knowledge must be immutable since his knowledge is identical with his immutable
substance. ll The objection-our objection-is that God's knowledge can
scarcely be immutable if it is to include temporal events. After all,
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God knew Christ would be born. But now he does not know that Christ will
be born, because it is not now the case that Christ will be born. Therefore it
is not the case that whatever God knew he knows. And so, it seems, God's
knowledge must be variable. 12

Before giving his solution Aquinas considers a variation on the contemporary
reply-eternalizing the proposition that God knows-only to reject it. He
then makes his own proposal:
It must therefore be conceded that this assertion "Whatever God knew he
knows," is not true if the reference is to statable things (si ad enuntiabilia
referatur). But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God
is variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God
knows one and the same thing sometime to be and sometime not to be, so it
is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows something
statable (scit aliquod enuntiabile) to be true at some time, and false at another.
The knowledge of God, however, would be variable ifhe knew statable things
in the mode of the statable, by composing and dividing, as happens in our
intellect (si enuntiabilia cognosce ret per modum enuntiabilium, componendo

et dividendo, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro ).13

It is not obvious how this reply is supposed to solve the problem. Why should
it matter whether God knows by composing and dividing or in a simpler way?
This seems irrelevant. For whether God must perform several acts or only
one to arrive at what we arrive at, we still must ask the same question about
the result, about what is grasped in divine thought. What is it that he knows?
If we say God knows what we know, that he knows what is happening now
or will happen or has happened, albeit by a simpler act than our own, it
remains that God is mutable. If, on the other hand, we deny that he knows
what we know, then God remains ignorant of some things. The point about
composing and dividing seems to leave the problem in exactly the same place.
But we can see the relevance of Thomas' suggestion that God does not
know by composing and dividing if we take into account an important point
made in the preceding article. There the question is whether God knows
statable facts (enuntiabilia). Thomas reasons that since the power to form the
statement of facts lies within the human mind, and since God knows whatever
is in the power of his creatures, God knows all the statements of fact that can
be formed. But since the divine mind, unlike the human mind, has no need
to unify in a statement an understanding of reality taken in bit by bit, (unum
redigere per modum compositionis vel divisionis, enuntiationem formando) ,
it does not understand statable facts by forming statements of them (scit
enuntiabilia non per modum enuntiabilium).J4
The important thing to note for our present purposes is that to say the divine
mind does not compose or divide is thus to say something not only about the
way the divine mind acts but also about the way reality is presented to the
divine mind-the object of the act. In a more contemporary idiom, we may

26

Faith and Philosophy

say that God's knowledge is nonpropositional, i.e., God does not form propositions to understand the world. And if God knows everything without forming propositions, then there is something wrong with the challenge to state
in propositional form just what God represents to himself of temporal events.
With his customary terseness, Thomas is thus proposing a remarkable solution
to the Argument from Omniscience. God knows all that we know about temporal
events, but in a way that we cannot adequately represent to ourselves.
Of course so extraordinary a claim has its difficulties, and we will shortly
consider some of them. This much, however, is already clear: the Argument
from Omniscience neglects an alternative.
The contradictory of God knows occurrences through indexical propositions is not God knows occurrences through non indexical propositions. The
contradictory is that It is not the case that God knows occurrences through
indexical propositions. The right way to set out the alternatives is this: Either
God knows propositionally or not. If the former, then he knows either by
indexical propositions or nonindexical propositions. Opponents of the traditional view have routinely overlooked the first division-propositional/nonpropositional-passing on immediately to the second. There thus remains the
neglected possibility that God knows the world in a way we cannot adequately
represent in any proposition.
To refute the traditional position one must block Aquinas' way out. This
few attempt. IS
5. An Objection: The Common View of Nonpropositional Knowledge
Perhaps some will say that the reason few attempt a refutation is because
it is unclear just what this putative nonpropositional knowledge is supposed
to be. Of course, we are familiar with non propositional knowledge in the
form of sensation-tasting an orange-but surely this is not what Aquinas
has in mind. Thomas is referring to intellectual knowledge, knowledge that
penetrates beneath the observable surface of things to get at the things themselves. But how is the mind to see things as they are without forming propositions?
Our understanding of Aquinas' point is apt to be very much conditioned
by the common conception of nondiscursive knowledge. As Richard Sorabji
observes,
It is commonly held that non-discursive thinking does not involve thinking
that something is the case. Instead it contemplates concepts in isolation from
each other, and does not string them together in the way they are strung
together in 'that' -clauses}6

On this account of the matter, nondiscursive thinking is a kind of subjudgmental exercise of intelligence indistinguishable from interrupted thought. You
start to think that beauty is truth, but get only to beauty when the number 68
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bus knocks you unconsciousP Nondiscursive knowledge is fragmentary
knowledge. By moving from concept to concept the mind grasps a state of
affairs, the fact that something is the case. Such a movement presupposes
lesser acts, none of which by itself attains an understanding of the way things
are. These lesser components are acts of nondiscursive understanding.
Construing non propositional thinking this way makes sense of the notion,
but it scarcely provides a defense for the traditional view of God's knowledge. Instead of an exalted mode of cognition, nonpropositional knowledge
turns out to be all too human half-thought. Limited to subjudgmental knowledge, God would be anything but omniscient. He would grasp no truth whatever. Thus the traditional view again seems to lapse into incoherence.

6. The Assumption Behind The Common View
of Nonpropositional Knowledge
Now Sorabji may well be right. Maybe the common view is that if a thought
is nonpropositional, then it must be mere contemplation of isolated concepts.
For this is the way we know the way things are. We string concepts together.
And so it is natural for us to assume that simple thought is necessarily
incomplete thought.
This, however, is only a natural assumption. It does not follow from x does
not know y by stringing concepts together that x does not know y. This is just
a special case of the invalid argument form: If x does y by z-ing, then if x
does not do y by z-ing, then x does not do y. If you can read by moving your
lips, it hardly follows that you cannot read without moving your lips. Of
course, if by definition reading involves lip movement, as people might have
thought in the early days of reading when silent reading was unknown, then
those who fail to move their lips would fail to read. And if by definition, to
know the truth of things is to string concepts together, it would then follow
that if a thinker did not string them together, the truth would not be attained.
But why should we assume that our way is the only way intellectually to
grasp a complex reality?
Thomas made no such assumption. In fact, he assumed the opposite. Our way
of knowing is accidental to knowing. IS It is a grave error to assimilate the divine
to the human mode of knowing. 19 The first step towards understanding the
classical view, at least as expounded by St. Thomas, is to set aside an idea of
nonpropositional thought as interrupted propositional thought.
But what, then, did Aquinas have in mind? Rather than sink the discussion
in exegesis, let's see what we can make of matters in our own terms.

7. An Uncommon Understanding of Nonpropositional Knowledge
For this purpose, it will be useful to introduce the expressions: "Occur-
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rence," "Intellectual Act," "Cognitive Display," "Mode of Intellectual Act,"
and "Mode of Cognitive Display."

7.1. Preliminaries: Occurrence, Intellectual Act, Cognitive Display,
Mode of Intellectual Act, and Mode of Cognitive Display
Occurrence. Let us refer to anything that happens within the space-time
system of things as an "occurrence."20 A bird landing on a branch, a clock's
hand sweeping past a number on its face, and a child breaking into a smile
are all occurrences. So too are more static realities, e.g., the statue staying
fixed in its place over time, and remaining, for however long, self-identical.
Intellectual Act. To know an occurrence a mind must do something to make
cognitive contact with it. Let us call this the intellectual act. A nonoccurrence
may also be the object of an intellectual act. Since, however, our present
problem concerns occurrences, we may confine our attention to intellectual
acts bearing on occurrences.
Cognitive Display. When by an intellectual act the mind makes contact
with an occurrence, we may say it displays the occurrence. The occurrence,
then, picks up the attribute of being cognitively displayed. 21
Here it is important to note two things.
First, "cognitive display" is not a substitute for "proposition. "22 The whole
point of introducing the concept of a cognitive display is to open the possibility of discussing nonpropositional modes of apprehending truth about reality. A "cognitive display" is a showing of an occurrence to a mind, whatever
the mode of display. "Propositional knowledge," by contrast, indicates a
particular mode of display. We shall return to this point in a moment.
Second, "cognitive display" does not refer to an ontological medium between the action of the mind and the occurrence in the world. It mayor may
not be necessary for a mind to form a medium to display the object. But by
"cognitive display" I mean the object displayed, not the medium of the display. In other words, if in order to display an occurrence it were necessary
to display it on a mental mirror, "cognitive display" would name the occurrence, not the mirror. A cognitive display of an occurrence is just the occurrence qua known.
Mode of Intellectual Act. The mind acts to display an occurrence in various
ways and with various levels of success. One act may display an occurrence
with less penetration than another, or in less detail. Smith knows the light
passing through the diamond somehow makes it bright; Jones knows the same
in terms of diamond's index of refraction. One intellectual act may display
an occurrence in isolation, while a second relates the occurrence to something
else. Smith knows an effigy of the Devil peeking from a huge boot was
discovered hanging from a Liberty Tree; Jones knows it to be in dishonor of
Lord Bute.
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In these cases the mode differs because the content is richer or poorer. But
that's not necessary for the mode to vary. Thinking that 21 has the prime
factors of 7 and 3 differs modally from thinking that 3 and 7 are the prime
factors of 21. The truth conditions are the same, but the intentional structures
of the act differ inasmuch as in one case the composite is taken first, in the
other the factors.
It would be difficult to define "mode of intellectual act." Fortunately,
however, what we need for our purposes is only the assurance that intellectual
acts can vary in mode even when displaying the same occurrence. The examples provide that assurance.
Mode of Cognitive Display. We may now say that two displays differ in
mode if the corresponding intellectual acts differ in any of the ways just
depicted or in any other way.
These noetic terms are meant neutrally, applying to divine knowledge as
well as human. Nevertheless, in order to try to state more accurately a theory
of nonpropositional knowledge that is free of the drawbacks of Sorabji's
"common" view of the matter, we need to take human knowledge as a point
of departure.

7.2. The Human Mode of Knowing
Propositional knowledge is a particular mode of displaying an occurrence
through an intentional referent and an abstract attribute (a property or relation). An abstract attribute is an attribute grasped abstractly. To grasp an
attribute abstractly is to separate the attribute from its real and possible
exemplifications. Things of this world, the referents of our cognitive displays,
exemplify abstract attributes, but do not possess abstract attributes. The
Black-capped Chickadee perching on a twig has no abstract attributes.
There's nothing abstract about her little black cap and bib, ragged over the
lower edge. She does not perch on an abstraction, nor does she perch abstractly. For there are no abstract twigs to perch on, nor is there any way to
perch abstractly. But we abstractly display the perching Chickadee through
concepts marshalled to form propositions. We cannot have propositional
knowledge about a thing of which we have no concept whatever. 23
There is yet another feature of propositional knowledge pertinent to our
discussion. As Russell once expressed it, our knowledge of things seems to
"radiate out" from these objects at the center of our attention. 24 We express
what we know of singular temporal events in relationship to the time of our
representations or utterances.
At least this is true of the passage of full blooded time, if not of what some
have called "bare temporality,"25 the mere sequential ordering of: earlier/simultaneous with/later. To grasp more than bare temporality, we must realize
the present temporal stage of the universe, as present, and other stages in
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relation to it. We grasp the present from within the series of temporal occasions and represent it with temporal indexicals.

7.3. The Divine Mode of Knowing
Human knowledge reflects the mind's need to compose and divide, and in
the case of knowledge of the present as present, it connects the intentional
subject with the attribute in a manner that indicates the temporal position of
the knower. Why must God display such knowledge in any other way?
Aquinas argues in several ways that the structure of God's knowledge is
nonpropositional. His deepest reason is that God is utterly simple,26 a doctrine
that for some is "a lot to swallow."27 But Thomas also argues without relying
on the doctrine of simplicity, taking as his point of departure the perfection
of the Creator's knowledge.
The Creator knows everything insofar as his causality extends to it. His
penetrating knowledge extends to the very individuality of things as causally
sustained by his acts. If any analogy with a movie is to be made, it is that
the movie is the story God tells. The creation does not exist prior to God's
knowledge of it; the Creator does not wait to see what he creates. By contrast
our knowledge of things is dependent upon a cognitive apparatus that grasps
things through universals, incompletely. The one who knows a thing by
having a universal concept of it does not know that thing in itself. "To know
Socrates through this, that he is white or the son of Sophroniscus, or to know
him through some other universal (quidquid aliud), is not to know him as
this man."28 But the "active power of God extends itself not only to the forms,
from which universal notions derive, but even to matter ... and singulars."29
By one intellectual act the divine mind attains intimate epistemic acquaintance with every concrete occurrence. God knows the whole of it, in all of its
individuality. He displays occurrences to himselfthrough a single intellectual
act, without relying on impoverished abstraction, and since he is beyond
space and time, without temporal self-reference.
The more perfect a being, Aquinas argues, the more perfect its mode of
knowing; the more perfect the mode the simpler. As internal sense powers grasp,
in a single act, complexes that external sense grasps separately or not at all,
so the divine mind grasps intellectually all that our composing and dividing
mind grasps through complex operations. As God knows the changeable unchangeably, and the material immaterially, he knows the composite simply.30
Just how God displays to himself nonpropositionally the fact we display as
The Chickadee is (now) perching on the twig we cannot say. Gone are the
abstractions through which we access and display the intentional subject and
predicate. God has no need of these. Gone too is the peculiar indexical mode
of connecting intentional subject and predicate, for gone too are intentional
subjects and attributes. As a race of blind beings that perceived extension
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only by synthesizing multiple touch sensations would find it difficult to
understand descriptions of another mode of perception that took in extension
all at once and without proprioceptive sensation,3) so we are mystified by the
description of knowledge that grasps temporal occurrences without synthesizing concepts and without temporal self-reference. But from the fact that
we find it difficult to imagine such knowledge, nothing whatever follows
about its possibility.
The mode of existence of a thing does not determine the mode of knowing
it. 32 In general it is not the case that for x to know y, which has characteristic
z, x's noetic act must have characteristic z. A yellow object may be sensed
without the sensation being yellow. Our way of knowing is accidental to
knowing. No a priori reason precludes an intelligence from knowing a temporal occurrence atemporally.
8. Returning to the Problem

I have stated, largely in my own terms, what I take Aquinas' view of
nonpropositional knowledge to be, and I have given some of the grounds for
thinking God enjoys such knowledge. Whether it is Aquinas' position or not,
the idea of nonpropositional knowledge spelled out here is far removed from
the common view of nonpropositional knowledge as "interrupted thought."
God does not string concepts together, but he displays everything to his mind
according to a mode above our own.
This isn't to say that we cannot affirmatively answer questions of the form
"Does God know it is now
?" It is just that we have to qualify the
answer. God knows what we know by thinking it is now
, but he
knows it "purely," without the intrusion of incidental elements peculiar to
our limited way of knowing. Our way is just one way to know the present as
present, peculiar to an intelligence that takes its knowledge from things. And
it is not God's.
It follows that we cannot adequately state in propositional form God's
knowledge of the present as present. Adequate representation of God's
knowledge as he represents it to himself requires more than representing the
same facts. It requires representing them in the same way. This we cannot do
since God's way of displaying occurrences couldn't be more alien to our own.
In reply to the Argument from Omniscience, it is thus open to a defender
of God's immutability to deny (4), that a being that always knows what time
it is is subject to change. It is true that (3) a being who knows everything
always knows what time it is. But it is true only in the sense that (3b)
throughout all its (timeless) existence, the being knows what time it is quoad
nos, i.e., what time it is for those whose existence is temporal. And though we
cannot meet the challenge to state adequately a proposition that expresses from
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the eternal point of view what it is that God knows, the challenge rests upon
the faulty presupposition that God displays his knowledge propositionally.

9. Conclusion
This reply to the Argument from Omniscience-or better, beginning of a
reply33-is of course open to objections. How could it be otherwise when we
are speaking of a way of knowing so much superior to our own? My main
purpose, however, has simply been to bring attention to a neglected way out
of the dilemma. Perhaps it will be helpful to conclude with a few remarks
directed to possible misunderstandings.
First, to say God knows nonpropositionally is not to say that God is ignorant
of propositions. These too he knows-nonpropositionally.34 Something G. E.
Moore says can serve to clarify this point. "Surely everybody can see that
the fact that a lion does exist is quite a different sort of entity from the lion
himself."3s Instead of saying with Moore that there are two facts here, we
may simply say that an existing lion may be displayed in the thought that a
lion does exist. The human mind spreads the existing lion into the fact that
the lion exists. The non propositional knower grasps the existing lion, the
beast itself, without refraction. And without refraction, he knows our mind
bends the light from every reality towards its own temporal locus.
Second, I do not mean, nor do I think Aquinas means, that the difference
between the human and divine mode of knowing is that God knows things
directly, while we must know them through an ontological medium, a proposition, dwelling in some queer limbo between mental acts and things.36
Consider a parallel. If it were to be claimed that some unearthly being could
see the whole moon, inside and outside, all at once, while we of course can
see only aspects of it, we should not immediately infer that we see something
distinct from the moon called Aspects, while the unearthly being saw the
moon itself. One might want to say that human knowledge of the world is
through an ontological medium; but that position is independent of the one
developed here.
Third, I do not mean to assert or to suggest that the world is in itself an
undifferentiated whole, that discriminations are the mere product of mind.
The bird and its perching, for example, are distinct realities. It is not that they
are distinct only for the human mind. But only the human mind is obliged to
grasp the bird's perching here and now by forming an abstract idea of it.
Last, with specific reference to time, I am not saying that time is unreal or
only a human construct, as if there is no temporal reality for God to know.
There is, and he knows it, but not in a way that requires temporal self-reference. The claim seems paradoxical because of our automatic assumption that
to know is to know in a human way. Thus we are apt to reason:
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But, of course, presentness cries out for a recipient, to be present is to be
present to someone ... The very concept of the now-of-the-present is thus
inseparably linked with a conscious experience, the experience of a being
who, from a position of placement within the framework of temporality
assumes with conscious awareness that temporal perspective through which
alone the A-series distinction of past/present/future [McTaggart's] can come
into operation. 37

It's this sailing from knowledge of the present requiring conscious experience
to requiring conscious experience within the framework of temporality, so
natural to us, that Aquinas bids us to resist.
College of St. Thomas
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